Immigration And Integration* (Part 2)
Jocelyne Cesari **
Secularization means that political power is defined by its neutral interactions with religious institutions.
The dominant argument advanced to explain difficulties of Muslim integration is the simple incompatibility of Islam with secular principles. Secularization means that political power is defined by its neutral interactions with religious institutions. It is important to note that, except in France, this principle of neutrality is not synonymous with separation. In fact, it is realized within various institutional structures, from state religion or the Concordat, to strict separation. Throughout Europe, Islam's arrival has reopened a case previously considered closed: that of the relationship between church and state. Analyzing specific examples, however, tends to shed more light on the specific political and cultural character of each European country than on any easily reduced "nature" of Islam.
The secularization profile specific to Europe can be divided into three modes: cooperation between the state and the churches, the existence of a state religion, and the separation between state and religion. In each case, the debate concerns the institutionalization of Islam and the search for credible Muslim representatives (Cesari).
Islam and the Secular State
The institutional agreements between Islamic organizations and the secular state are only one aspect of the status of religions within Europe and the United States. Beyond the differentiation of the political and religious spheres and the notion of neutrality lies an ideological sense of what it means to be secular that has its roots in the philosophy of the Enlightenment.
A common denominator of Western European countries is their tendency to consider that the religious is misplaced and illegitimate within the context of inter-citizen social relationships. The idea that religion cannot play a role in the general well-being of societies — a mark of the secularized mind — is, in fact, spread relatively evenly throughout Europe, despite the differences in the national contracts between states and organized religion. The consequence is that the various manifestations of Islam in Europe are seen as troublesome, or even unacceptable. The hijab (headscarf) controversy and the status of the apostate as debated during the Rushdie affair reveal the tension between Islamic claims and the European conception of secularism.
Questioning the Merits of Multiculturalism
The difficulty of integrating Muslims into European societies has led many to question the merits of multiculturalism. As recent polling shows, there is substantial public resistance to multiculturalism, and a growing desire for cultural homogeneity related to a fear of Islam and Muslims. According to the 2000 Eurobarometer survey, 25 percent of Belgians show intolerant attitudes, above the EU average of 14 percent (ECRI Report on Belgium, 2003).
In Germany, a survey in December 2003 found 65 percent claiming that Islam could not fit with the West, while majorities opposed any new immigration and would feel uncomfortable living in a neighborhood with Muslims (Schmitt). This tension is also reflected in the rising numbers of Turks in Germany who feel they are being discriminated against (Turks.us).
A 2003 study showed substantial anti-Muslim attitudes in Italy, with half of Italians believing Muslims are fanatic fundamentalists who support terrorism. Fifty-six percent of Italians believe that Muslims have "cruel and barbaric laws," 47 percent consider them "religious fundamentalist and fanatics," and 33 percent are convinced that they are invading (Palmieri-Billig).
Even in the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain, which have long had relatively positive multiculturalist attitudes, a shift can be seen. The country most notably changed is probably the Netherlands, where the rise of explicitly anti-Muslim politics reflects both skepticism about the ability to integrate Muslims into society, and a critique of what were once widely accepted ideals of cultural diversity. A parliamentary report determined that "multiethnic society had been a dismal failure, huge ethnic ghettos and subcultures were tearing the country apart and the risk of polarization could only be countered by Muslims effectively becoming Dutch" (Fekete 20).
Muslims in Europe may internalize only parts of the European cultural system, maintaining objections to some values, especially with gender equality and sexuality (Cesari 157). Such a resistance is perceived as a threat to the idea of a collective culture. In the last few years, many countries, including Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have passed new immigration laws that require migrants to learn about the host society and pass a competency test. In Austria, these policies have been accompanied by penalties for failure, including deportation, fines, and cuts in social benefits (International Helsinki Federation).
An Integration Under International Constraints
Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11), most of the countries under discussion had some experience with terrorism. In the United Kingdom and Spain, these were regionally focused difficulties with internal separatist groups, the IRA and ETA, respectively. In Germany and the United States, the primary threats were historically from internal ideological groups, although both nations had experienced several international terrorist incidents related to Middle Eastern political conflicts. During the 1990s, there was a wave of terrorism in France. This was associated with French policy in Algeria and was carried out mostly by international leaders who recruited domestic Algerian immigrants to their cause.
Each of these nations had a legal framework for dealing with terrorist threats. Nonetheless, the scale of the attacks on 9/11 came as a severe shock, and thus was rapidly followed by new anti-terrorism and immigration policies in most European countries and at the European Union level. The attacks in Madrid and London have also led to more legal and political initiatives to prevent terrorism. Many of these legislative efforts were already in the process of consideration, and the governments took advantage of the public mood to rapidly pass items that may have been too controversial before the attacks.
Legislation passed since 9/11 shows a trend towards conflating immigration and nationalization regimes with internal and external security in a way that will have negative long-term effects on the Muslim populations of Europe. This is likely to remain a problem for several reasons.
First, if international terrorists based in foreign countries are recruiting among the disaffected populations of Europe, this becomes a simultaneously internal and external security problem. The 9/11 plots were at least partially planned in Hamburg, and among the individuals imprisoned by the United States in Guantanamo Bay include at least 20 Europeans (Savage). There are claims that 1 to 2 percent of all European Muslims (between 250,000 to 500,000 people) may be involved in radical activities (Savage). Since 9/11, the nations of the European Union have arrested more than 20 times the number of terrorist suspects as the United States (Cesari). More recently, there have been strong suspicions that groups from Iraq have been recruiting in Europe (Whitlock).
States are naturally concerned that individuals recruited and trained for overseas battles may eventually turn towards terrorism against Western nations. This is undoubtedly the case for the generation of fighters trained ideologically and militarily in the battle to cast off Soviet domination of Afghanistan. Many of these individuals would eventually gravitate towards radical Islamic groups. Because of this threat, states can take a view of domestic Muslims as "foreign enemies," a classification that implies a much lower level of legal and social rights and privileges.
Second, several of the world's hot spots that are likely to generate asylum seekers and other refugees are in areas where radical Islam already has a foothold. This is the case in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and even in the Balkan states. Although it is unlikely that many of the refugees are already ideologically committed, there is a fear that some will be, and that such populations may be susceptible to radicalism when they enter European societies. More simply, the attacks of 9/11 showed that international terrorists are capable of exploiting weaknesses in immigrant management, and states have responded by clamping down on immigration.
Finally, the influx of Muslims into Europe has created and exacerbated social tensions. Strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the populace is likely to generate response from politicians. Anti-Muslim attitudes have deep historical roots in European culture. Media images of violence and oppression convince many Europeans that these phenomena are inextricably linked to Muslims. The Muslim ghettos created in Europe over the last decade are not likely to be warmly welcomed by the local populations. Even when Muslims are not individually marginalized, seemingly insignificant cultural differences, such as methods of slaughter, can inspire strong reactions. The response of governments to these daunting social issues is one of crackdown. One might characterize this as an attempt to eliminate the problem of integrating Muslims rather than searching for a solution. Interestingly, it seems that the response to this most recent wave of terrorism has been substantially more severe than in previous European experience.
Gloomy Future for Islam in Europe
The conflation of internal and external security has led to a particular emphasis on controlling the speech of Muslim leaders. That emphasis can be seen in the rising numbers of imams expelled from European countries and in increasingly frequent attempts to control and infiltrate mosques. Across Europe, dozens of imams have been expelled for preaching beliefs that the state considers threatening (Nederlands Dagblad). Probably the most famous have been the British imams, Abu Hamza al-Masri and Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed, who were accused of speaking in favor of Osama bin Laden, and even of helping to recruit terrorists. Lower-profile cases have been a frequent occurrence in France, Germany, and Italy (Hundley). The new police rights to spy on religious groups passed in various countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States, are part of an effort to control the speech of religious leaders.
As Muslims are already in difficult social and economic situations, these types of activities are likely to increase sentiments of alienation and disaffection. If Muslims begin to feel that they are not legitimate members of the nation, this may well lead to negative reactions against the nation (Cesari 91-109).
Three scenarios are possible: acceptance, avoidance, or resistance.1 These three possible attitudes subtend the multiplicity of discourses and actions in the name of Islam whether they are oriented towards Muslims or non-Muslims.
Acceptance means that the dominant discourse is accepted by Muslims, and is accompanied by cultural amnesia and a definite will to assimilate. This trend is marginal amongst immigrant Muslims.
Avoidance refers to behaviors or discourses that attempt to separate Muslim societies from the non-Muslim environment by developing, for example, a sectarian usage of Islamic religious beliefs.
Resistance means refusing the status given to Islam within dominant discourses and politics. Resistance need not be violent: It can involve, for example, taking a view opposite to that of dominant narratives, and producing a voluminous literature that functions as an apology of Islam. As for practices, certain forms of resistance involve what Erving Goffman calls "contact terrorism," which means using certain Islamic symbols linked to clothing or behavior in order to provoke the Other's fear and repulsion.
Resistance can also take on more radical forms, such as the involvement in violent Islamic movements. Prominent examples include Khaled Kelkal, a French citizen born in France to Algerian parents who was involved in the GIA battle in 1993; John Reid, the shoe bomber; John Leid, who joined the cause of Al-Qaeda; and the bombers in London and Madrid. Although these forms of resistance are not dominant, they are highly visible and more and more influential in the way Islam is perceived in Europe. However, there also exist positive forms of resistance through which Muslims reappropriate elements of Islamic practice, acknowledging a personal commitment to their faith while simultaneously accepting European societies as their own.
Selected Bibliography
Cesari, J. When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Cesari, J. and Sean Mcloughin, ed. European Muslims and the Secular State. Ashgate: 2005.
Dassetto, F., B. Maréchal and J. Nielsen, eds. Convergences musulmanes, aspects contemporains de la présence musulmane dans l'Europe élargie, Louvain La Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2001.
"80% of German Turks Feel Discriminated Against." Turks.us 27 Nov 2004.
Fekete, L. "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State, Race and Class." Race and Class 46.1 (2004): 3-29.
Hundley, T. "Radical Imams Trouble Europe." Chicago Tribune 13 June 2004.
International Helsinki Federation.
Islam and Fundamental Rights in Europe. Report for the European Commission, DG Justice and Home Affairs, 2004.
Lewis, Bernard. Interview. "Europa Wird Am Ende Des Jahrhunderts Islamisch Sein." Die Welt 28 July 2004.
Palmieri-Billig, Lisa. "Survey Shows Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism Rising in Italy." Jerusalem Post 1 July 2003.
Postiglione, Gerard A. Ethnicity and American Social Theory. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1983.
Savage, T. M. Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing. Washington Quarterly 27 (2004): 25-50.
Schmitt, Khaled. "Islamophobia on Rise in Germany: Study." IslamOnline.net 26 Dec 2003.
"Verdonk Zet Drie Imams Het Land Uit Van Onze Redactie Politiek." Nederlands Dagblad 23 Feb 2005.
Whitlock, C. "In Europe New Force for Recruiting Radicals: Ansar Al-Islam Emerges as Primary Extremist Group Funneling Fighters into Iraq." Washington Post 18 Feb 2005.
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* Excerpts of this text were published in Italian in Aspenia Journal,October 2005.
** Jocelyne Cesari is a professor in political science. She is a senior research fellow at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in Paris and Sorbonne University and visiting professor at Harvard University.
1- Cf. Postiglione, Gerard A., Ethnicity and American Social Theory, Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1983, pp. 181-182.